

HANDBOOK OF  
AFFECT AND SOCIAL COGNITION

Edited by

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## Affective Influences on the Self-Concept: Qualifying the Mood-Congruency Principle

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The pivotal role of transient affect (i.e., mood) in human functioning is well established (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Fiedler & Bless, in press; Forgas, 1992, 1995). Mood influences judgment, memory, and behavior.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Our review excludes experiments that involve misattribution of mood states or experiments that manipulate the degree to which participants are aware of their mood states (e.g., Clore, Gaspar, & Garvin, chap. 6, this volume; Smith, chap. 4, this volume; Levine, Wyer, & Schwarz, 1994; Martin, Abend, Sedikides, & Green, 1997). Also, our review excludes experiments in which the mood-induction task was actually a failure or success experience based on task performance feedback (e.g., McFarland & Buehler, 1997, 1998).

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Specifically, mood states modify social judgments such as person and couple impressions, attributions for success or failure, and attitudes or beliefs. Moods affect memory and decision making (e.g., bargaining strategies), and change behavior, such as type of requests (i.e., polite or impolite) and intergroup discrimination. In addition, moods influence self-cognitions defined as judgments about the self (i.e., self-perceptions or self-evaluations), recall of autobiographical knowledge, or expectancies of self-relevant outcomes.

An earlier review of how experimentally induced mood states affect the valence (i.e., positivity–negativity) of self-cognitions focused exclusively on happy and sad moods (Sedikides, 1992). We adhere to tradition in this updated review—partly because of the historical prevalence of the affective valence dimension (e.g., Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957; Scherer, Koivumaki, & Rosenthal, 1972) and partly because additional affective states (e.g., anxiety, anger, stress) are covered by other contributions to this book (Bodenhausen, Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Moreno, chap. 15, this volume; and Suls, chap. 18, this volume).

The previously mentioned earlier review (Sedikides, 1992) pursued a general, unifying principle regarding the influence of happy and sad moods on the valence of the self-concept. The review concluded that this principle was mood congruency: happy moods augment the positivity of self-cognitions, whereas sad moods augment the negativity of self-cognitions.<sup>2</sup> For example, relative to sad moods, happy moods elicit favorable self-judgments, increase recall of positive self-referent information, and induce higher expectancies of positive self-relevant outcomes.

Research has continued to provide support for the mood congruency principle as it pertains to self-cognitions [e.g., Abele-Brehm & Hermer, 1993; Nasby, 1994 (judgment results); Nasby, 1996].<sup>3</sup> Most of the recent empirical efforts, however, have sought to qualify the mood-congruency principle. Our goal in the current review is to summarize these efforts. We review post-1992 research that qualifies the mood-congruency principle. We are guided theoretically in this selective review by Forgas' Affect Infusion Model (AIM; 1995, chap. 14, this volume).

<sup>2</sup>Another review (Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992) established mood congruency as a general principle in the domain of non-self-relevant cognitions. For relevant discussions, see also: Bower & Forgas, chap. 5, this volume; Fiedler, chap. 8, this volume; Petty, DeSteno, & Rucker, chap. 10, this volume; and Salovey, Detwiler, Steward, & Bedell, chap. 16, this volume.

<sup>3</sup>For a nonreplication, see Cervone, Kopp, Schaumann, and Scott (1994, Experiments 1 and 2). These researchers reported null effects of mood on perceived self-efficacy.

## THE AFFECT INFUSION MODEL

A key construct of the AIM is affect infusion, “the process whereby affectively loaded information exerts an influence on and becomes incorporated into the judgmental process, entering into the judge’s constructive deliberations and eventually coloring the judgmental outcome” (Forgas, 1995, p. 39). Some kinds of processing strategies are characterized by low infusion potential. These are the direct-access strategy (i.e., when knowledge structures are retrieved from memory) and motivated-processing strategy (i.e., when processing is goal-driven). Other kinds of processing strategies involve relatively high infusion potential. One such strategy is heuristic processing, requiring an improvised judgment. Another strategy in which the judgment must be computed on-line is substantive processing. This strategy involves “the substantial transformation rather than the mere reproduction of existing cognitive representations, requiring a relatively open information search strategy, and a significant degree of generative elaboration of the available stimulus details” (Forgas, 1995, p. 39).

The AIM has important implications for the role of mood in the self-concept. The model predicts reasonably well the circumstances under which mood-congruency effects will or will not be obtained. These circumstances or moderators fall under three broad categories: type of self-conceptions, individual differences, and judgmental task features.

### Type of Self-Conceptions

Does mood affect all aspects of the self-concept in a similar (i.e., valuatively congruent) manner? Alternatively, are mood congruency effects localized in a specific type of self-conceptions?

**Central and Peripheral Self-Conceptions.** Two types of self-conceptions have garnered the lion’s share of the attention of self-concept theorists: central and peripheral self-conceptions (Gergen, 1968; Rosenberg, 1988; Stryker, 1980). These types of cognitive structures differ in several important ways, such as elaboration, certainty, positivity, and diagnosticity (Sedikides, 1995). Relative to peripheral ones, central self-conceptions contain higher amounts of detailed (i.e., elaborated) autobiographic knowledge, are held with higher certainty, are more positive, and are more likely to be thought of as representing the “true” self (Dunning, Perie, & Story, 1991; Sedikides, 1993). It is no surprise, then, that central self-conceptions are affirmed more strongly than peripheral ones (Markus, 1977; Pelham,

1991; Sedikides, 1993) through such mechanisms as selective attention to feedback, biased interpretation or explanation of feedback, reconstructive memory, and selective exposure to confirming social environments (Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Swann, 1990).

Based on the previously mentioned distinctions, Sedikides (1995) proposed that central and peripheral self-conceptions will be differentially sensitive to the influence of mood. Information pertaining to central and peripheral self-conceptions is likely to be processed via different AIM-specified strategies. Processing of information relevant to central self-conceptions likely has low infusion potential: such processing is either motivated by or presupposes the direct accessing of an already formed cognitive structure. However, processing of information relevant to peripheral self-conceptions likely has high infusion potential: such information requires the on-line computation of a judgment.

This analysis leads to differing hypotheses regarding the influence of mood on central versus peripheral self-conceptions. Mood will not affect central self-conceptions, but will affect peripheral self-conceptions in a valuatively congruent manner. Type of self-conceptions will qualify the mood-congruency principle.

**Empirical Evidence.** The differential sensitivity hypothesis has been tested in four experiments reported by Sedikides (1995). As a reminder, central and peripheral self-conceptions are likely to differ in four characteristics: valence, diagnosticity, certainty, and elaborative knowledge. In Experiment 1, Sedikides (1995) focused exclusively on the role of valence and diagnosticity.

Participants in the first experimental session generated four positive and four negative central traits, and four positive and four negative peripheral traits. The top three traits from each of the 16 categories were selected for subsequent use. Experimental assistants generated 12 high-diagnosticity behaviors for each trait. Diagnosticity was defined in terms of the likelihood of each behavior revealing whether the actor possessed the underlying trait. This pool of behaviors was rated by an independent sample in terms of diagnosticity. The result was the selection of 36 highly diagnostic behaviors (i.e., three behaviors per trait). Testing insured that the behaviors in all categories were approximately equal in diagnosticity and valence.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>The central positive behaviors were rated significantly higher than the peripheral positive behaviors on valence. However, ancillary analyses ruled out differential valence as an explanation for the obtained findings.

Examples of the behaviors are: "I am the kind of person who would be able to complete both her Ph.D. and MD in 6 years" ("intelligent"—central positive trait); "I am the kind of person who would think and act funny around people I didn't know very well" ("socially awkward"—central negative trait); "I am the kind of person who would easily disappear for a week in the woods . . . just for kicks" ("carefree"—peripheral positive trait); and "I am the kind of person who would follow the advice of his parents for which professional or graduate school to attend" ("dependent"—peripheral negative trait).

Then, participants were telephoned and invited to a second laboratory session. Participants were put successfully into happy, neutral, or sad mood states through a guided imagery procedure. Participants in the happy mood condition imagined that a friend had won a free cruise to the Caribbean islands and also had won \$1,000,000 in the lottery. Participants in the neutral mood condition imagined a friend watching television and riding the bus. Finally, participants in the sad mood condition imagined that a friend was burned in a fire and died. Next, participants rated themselves on the 36 behaviors. Participants completed their ratings one at a time and on a scale ranging from *definitely not me* to *definitely me*.

The results confirmed the differential sensitivity hypothesis. Mood did not influence the endorsement of behaviors that exemplified central traits. However, mood influenced in a congruent manner the endorsement of behaviors that exemplified peripheral traits. That is, compared to neutral mood, happy mood led to higher endorsement of peripheral positive behaviors but lower endorsement of peripheral negative behaviors. For example, happy participants considered the behavior "I am the kind of person who would easily disappear for a week in the woods . . . just for kicks" as more self-descriptive than neutral-mood participants, but considered the behavior "I am the kind of person who would follow the advice of his parents for which professional or graduate school to attend" as less self-descriptive than neutral-mood participants. The findings can be viewed from the perspective of the effects of sad mood. Compared to neutral mood, sad mood led to lower endorsement of peripheral negative behaviors but higher endorsement of peripheral positive behaviors. For example, in comparison to neutral-mood participants, sad participants considered the behavior "I am the kind of person who would easily disappear for a week in the woods . . . just for kicks" as less self-descriptive, but considered the behavior "I am the kind of person who would follow the advice of his parents for which professional or graduate school to attend" as more self-descriptive. Importantly, these findings generalized over valence and diagnosticity. The

divergent effects of mood on the self could not be attributed to valence and diagnosticity differences between central and peripheral self-conceptions.

Could the mood effects be attributed to differences in certainty between central and peripheral self-conceptions? Experiment 2 sought to address this question. In the first experimental session, participants generated 16 traits: four central positive, four central negative, four peripheral positive, and four peripheral negative. Participants also rated these traits for valence and certainty of possession. Twelve traits were selected for subsequent use. (The mean valence ratings of these traits were approximately equal across the four categories.<sup>5</sup>) In the second experimental session, participants completed the dependent measure by rating the 12 traits for self-descriptiveness.

The results replicated the previous findings in bolstering the differential processing hypothesis. Mood did not alter the endorsement of central traits, but it did alter the endorsement of peripheral traits in a congruent manner. Happy participants were most likely to endorse peripheral positive traits and least likely to endorse peripheral negative traits. Importantly, these findings were due, in part, to certainty differences between central and peripheral traits. A reason that peripheral traits are more susceptible to the impact of mood than central traits is because peripheral traits are held with lower certainty.

Although the two experiments described are consistent with the AIM, they do not provide direct support for it. The purpose of Experiment 3 was to test the proposition of the AIM that affect is infused in the judgment (i.e., behavior or trait endorsement) to a greater degree when peripheral self-relevant information is processed, because in this case, substantive (rather than heuristic) processing takes place. If this proposition is correct, then judgmental latencies for the endorsement of peripheral traits would exceed endorsement latencies for central traits. Experiment 3 replicated the previous two experiments in showing that mood alters the valence of peripheral but not central self-conceptions. More importantly, however, Experiment 3 provided evidence for substantive processing of peripheral self-relevant information: Participants took more time to decide whether peripheral (as opposed to central) traits were self-descriptive, and this judgmental latency mediated their endorsement ratings. Another reason, besides certainty, for the differential influence of mood on peripheral versus central traits is that peripheral self-cognitions are less elaborated in autobiographic memory.

<sup>5</sup>As in Experiment 1, the central positive behaviors had significantly higher valence ratings than the peripheral positive behaviors. Supplementary analyses, however, ruled out differential valence as an explanation for the obtained findings.

Experiment 3 obtained mediational support for the notion that substantive processing is implicated in the case of peripheral traits. Experiment 4 sought direct support for this notion. Participants were induced into a happy, sad, or neutral mood state and were asked to complete self-descriptiveness ratings on three peripheral positive and three peripheral negative traits. Half of the participants were given low on-line elaboration instructions: They were asked to rate the traits at a rapid rate (i.e., 5 seconds per trait). The other half of the participants were placed in the high on-line elaboration condition: They were asked to think for 1 minute as to whether the trait was characteristic of them and then complete the trait rating. The results supported the proposition that mood affects the endorsement of peripheral self-cognitions through substantive processing. Mood congruency effects were stronger in the high than low on-line elaboration condition.

**Summary.** Type of self-conceptions is a potent moderator of the mood congruency principle. Mood influences peripheral self-cognitions in a valuably congruent manner, but it has no effect on central self-cognitions.

### Individual Differences

Another possible moderator of mood effects on the self is individual differences (Rusting, chap. 17, this volume). We are concerned, more specifically, with differences in level of self-esteem. Does mood affect persons with low and high self-esteem differently?

**Self-Esteem.** The construct of self-esteem continues to captivate social and personality psychologists (Baumeister, 1993, 1998). An important difference between persons with low and high self-esteem concerns the certainty or stability of self-knowledge. Persons with low self-esteem are less certain of who they are (Campbell et al., 1996) and are less stable over time in their self-views (Kernis & Waschull, 1996).

Capitalizing on this difference, the AIM offers interesting predictions. Mood influences persons with low self-esteem to a greater degree than persons with high self-esteem. That is, affect is infused to a greater degree in persons with low self-esteem given that these persons likely vacillate more in their self-judgments due to the uncertainty of their self-views.

**Empirical Evidence.** Smith and Petty (1995, Experiment 2) reported results relevant to the previously mentioned predictions. These researchers placed participants with low and high self-esteem in either sad or neutral

mood states through video clips. Participants in the sad mood condition watched a clip of a boy dying of cancer, whereas participants in the neutral mood condition watched a clip on the social behavior of lions. Next, participants listed three memories from their high-school years. These memories were coded for degree of positivity by independent coders.

Smith and Petty (1995, Experiment 2) analyzed the results in terms of both first memory listed and total number of memories listed. The results were identical and supportive of the AIM. Specifically, participants with low self-esteem generated more memories in the sad than neutral mood condition. However, participants with high self-esteem generated an equivalent (i.e., nonsignificantly different) amount of memories in the two mood conditions. Stated somewhat differently, a mood-congruency effect was obtained only in the case of persons with low self-esteem.

Brown and Mankowski (1993) also examined the influence of mood on self-judgments of persons with low and high self-esteem. In Experiment 1, Brown and Mankowski placed participants with low and high self-esteem into a mood state through the Velten (1968) procedure. Participants in the happy mood condition read positively valenced self-referent statements (e.g., "I am cheerful and lively"). Participants in the sad mood condition read negatively valenced self-referent statements (e.g., "My life is so tiresome, the same old thing day after day depresses me"). Finally, participants in the neutral mood condition read statements that were neither valenced nor referenced (e.g., "Utah is the Beehive state"). Next, participants rated themselves on 16 adjectives, half of which were positive and half were negative.

Mood influenced the self-evaluations of persons with low self-esteem in a valuably congruent manner. That is, compared to neutral mood, sad mood increased the negativity of self-ratings, whereas happy mood increased the positivity of self-ratings. However, mood had mixed effects with regard to the self-evaluations of persons with high self-esteem. The effects of happy mood did not differ significantly from the effects of neutral mood. These results can also be interpreted by comparing the effects of each mood state for persons with low and high self-esteem. Happy mood did not influence differentially persons with low and high self-esteem. However, sad mood did so, as it lowered the self-evaluations of persons with low, but not high, self-esteem.

In Experiment 2, Brown and Mankowski (1993) used only happy and sad mood conditions, and they induced mood through both the Velten procedure and musical selections (a jazz version of Bach's "Brandenburg Concerto No. 3" played by Hubert Laws in the happy mood condition,

and Prokofiev's "Russia Under the Mongolian Yoke" played at half speed in the sad mood condition). Note that the two musical procedures yielded similar findings. These findings approximated the findings from Experiment 1. A statistically significant mood congruency effects was evident in the self-evaluations of persons with low self-esteem: Sad mood participants rated the self more negatively than happy mood participants. However, only a marginal mood congruency effect emerged in the case of the self-evaluations of persons with high self-esteem: Sad mood participants tended to rate the self more negatively than happy mood participants. Viewed from another angle, sad mood lowered substantially the self-evaluations of persons with low self-esteem, but it also lowered (significantly but less forcefully) the self-evaluations of persons with high self-esteem.

Taken together, the results of Smith and Petty (1995, Experiment 2) and Brown and Mankowski (1993, Experiments 1 and 2) are consistent with the AIM. Reliable congruency effects are observed with regard to the impact of mood on the self-perceptions of persons with low self-esteem. However, the effects of mood on the self-perceptions of persons with high self-esteem are rather inconsistent.

**Summary.** The individual difference of level of self-esteem emerged as a moderator of the mood-congruency principle. Mood influences in a valuably congruent way how persons with low self-esteem view themselves, but it does not influence in a clear and systematic way how persons with high self-esteem view themselves.

How do the findings reviewed under the "Individual Differences" section relate to the findings reviewed under the "Type of Self-Conceptions" section? Sedikides (1995) reported mood effects on peripheral but not central self-conceptions. Were Smith and Petty (1995, Experiment 2) and Brown and Mankowski (1993, Experiments 1 and 2) concerned exclusively with peripheral self-conceptions? Although the latter two teams of researchers did not distinguish between types of self-conceptions, a perusal of their stimulus materials suggests that they used a mixture of peripheral and central self-conceptions. It is likely that the mood effects that these investigators reported were driven primarily by the endorsement patterns of peripheral self-conceptions. An important issue for future research is whether mood effects are an interactive function of type of self-conceptions and self-esteem. Are the central and peripheral self-conceptions of persons with low and high self-esteem influenced differentially by mood?

## Judgmental Task Features

The third and final class of moderators of the mood congruency principle that we wish to consider involves features of the judgmental task. Three moderators have received empirical attention: affirmative versus nonaffirmative judgment, judgment of performance outcomes versus performance standards, and timing (immediate vs. delayed) of judgment.

Note that the relevancy of the AIM to this class of moderators is limited. The first moderator concerns the inhibitory effects of mood on encoding. The second and third moderators have to do, at least in part, with mood regulation. The AIM was not designed to address these issues. Nevertheless, the moderators are reviewed, as they place critical constraints on the mood-congruency principle.

**Affirmative versus Nonaffirmative Judgment.** Participants in Nasby's (1994) experiment were assigned into a happy, neutral, or sad mood state. Mood was induced through the Velten procedure. Next, participants were presented with 40 trait adjectives (20 positive and 20 negative) and were asked the question, "Does the following adjective describe you?" Participants completed both an affirmative (facilitatory) judgment and a nonaffirmative (inhibitory) judgment to each question. The affirmative judgment involved responding "Yes" to each question, whereas the nonaffirmative judgment involved responding "No" to each question. Following a filler task, participants were asked to recall the 40 trait adjectives.

The nature of the judgmental task moderated the effects of mood on recall. Mood-congruency effects were generally evident in the case of affirmative judgment. Compared to neutral mood, happy mood led to an increase in the recall of positive trait adjectives, although it did not decrease recall of negative trait adjectives. In a parallel manner, compared to neutral mood, sad mood led to an increase in the recall of negative trait adjectives, although it did not reduce recall of positive trait adjectives. However, mood-congruency effects were eliminated in the case of nonaffirmative judgment. Mood had no influence on inhibitory encoding processes.

Although, as stated, Nasby's (1994) experiment does not necessarily constitute a direct test of the AIM (nor was it designed as such), the results are somewhat inconsistent with the tenets of AIM. Affirmative knowledge is well-established structurally in memory (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Newman, Wolff, & Hearst, 1980) and likely is held with relatively high certainty. Nonaffirmative self-knowledge, however, likely is generated on external (e.g., experimental) demand, thus resembling an on-line judgment.

If these premises are correct, one would expect (based on AIM) the opposite pattern of results from that reported by Nasby: Mood-congruency effects on recall would be present in the case of nonaffirmative judgment, but absent in the case of affirmative judgment. Future research should explore more systematically the susceptibility of nonaffirmative encoding to the influence of mood.

**Judgment of Performance Outcomes versus Performance Standards.** Cervone, Kopp, Schaumann, and Scott (1994, Experiment 3) distinguished between two kinds of performance expectancies: outcomes versus standards. *Performance outcomes* referred to participants' satisfaction with attaining a designated performance level. *Performance standards* referred to participants' minimum satisfactory level of performance.

Cervone et al. (1994, Experiment 3) induced either a sad or neutral mood through tape-recorded instructions. In the sad mood condition, participants imagined their best friend dying of cancer; in the neutral mood condition, participants visualized their room at home. Next, participants completed the dependent measures.

In the case of performance outcomes, participants rated how satisfied they would feel with themselves if they were to perform a task or an activity at a designated level. Participants rated 16 items, 10 of which pertained to academic tasks (e.g., "Present an oral report in front of a small class") or social tasks (e.g., "Tell a joke or a humorous anecdote at a party"). For these items, the designated level of performance was a level equal to that of the average individual. The remaining 6 items involved academic tasks (e.g., grade in introductory psychology, GPA), but the designated performance level was a specific numeric value. In the case of performance standards, participants rated the same 16 items, but with a different criterion in mind. Specifically, participants were asked to indicate the minimum level of performance that they would have to attain in order to be satisfied with how well they had done.

Mood affected performance outcomes in a congruent manner. Sad mood participants expressed lower evaluations of future outcomes than neutral mood participants. However, mood affected performance standards in an incongruent manner. Sad participants expressed higher personal standards than neutral mood participants. (For a replication of the latter finding, see Cervone et al., 1994, Experiments 1 and 2.)

There are at least two plausible explanations for the obtained mood incongruency results on performance standards. One explanation involves attributive processes (Clore, Gaspar, & Garvin, chap. 6, this volume;



Schwarz, 1990). Participants misattributed their sad mood to dissatisfaction with their performance and, hence, increased their performance standards in order to alleviate the feeling of dissatisfaction. A second explanation involves straightforward mood repair notions (Scheier & Carver, 1982; Erber & Erber, chap. 13, this volume). Participants in the sad mood condition elevated their standards in an effort to end their uncomfortable mood state.

**Timing of Judgment.** The mood repair notion has implication for an experiment reported by Sedikides (1994). Participants were placed into a happy, neutral, or sad mood state using guided imagery procedures similar to those of Sedikides (1995). Then, participants were handed a 40-page booklet and were asked to "tell us about yourself." Participants were instructed to write one open self-description on each page of the booklet and were allotted 6 minutes for the task. (Pilot testing had indicated that the duration of mood well exceeded the 6 minute mark.) After a 13-minute filler task, whose purpose was to ensure that the effects of mood had vanished, participants rated the valence of their listed self-descriptions.

Self-descriptions were divided up into halves and were entered in the analyses as a variable. Mood-congruency effects were obtained in the first half of self-descriptions. Sad mood participants described themselves in more negative terms than neutral mood participants; conversely, happy mood participants described themselves in more positive terms than neutral mood participants. However, a mixed pattern was obtained in the second half of self-descriptions. Although happy mood participants still described themselves more positively than neutral mood participants, neutral and sad mood participants did not differ in the positivity of their self-descriptions.

Timing, then, made a difference. In the first few (2–3) minutes following mood induction, mood affected self-descriptions in a congruent way. However, with the passage of time (after 3–4 minutes), sad mood ceased to influence the valence of self-views. Perhaps with the passage of time, mood repair processes became operative. Timing of self-judgment is a moderator of the mood-congruency principle.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter was concerned with the impact of mood states, specifically sad and happy states, on self-cognitions. The chapter built on an earlier review (Sedikides, 1992) that proposed that mood influences the self in a

valuatively congruent manner. Although support for the mood-congruency principle continues to accumulate (e.g., Abele-Brehm & Hermer, 1993; Nasby, 1996), the current review engaged in a selective search for moderators of this general principle.

This review discussed research that used a variety of mood-induction procedures (e.g., guided imagery, musical selections, Velten) and several different dependent measures (e.g., self-evaluations, memory, judgments of future outcomes, self-descriptions). The review identified three moderators: type of self-conceptions, individual differences (i.e., self-esteem), and judgmental task features. Mood influences congruently the way in which individuals perceive themselves on peripheral self-conceptions, but mood does not affect self-perceptions on central self-conceptions. Mood affects congruently the self-evaluations of persons with low, but not necessarily persons with high, self-esteem. Finally, mood congruency effects are present (1) following facilitatory but not inhibitory encoding, (2) when judging performance outcomes but not performance standards, and (3) when the self is described in the immediate rather than distant future.

The AIM served as a useful integrative framework of much of the reviewed work. The AIM can explain reasonably well the confirmations and disconfirmations of the mood congruency principle with regard to the first two moderators, namely, type of self-conceptions and self-esteem. However, the AIM has difficulty accounting for the full spectrum of results concerning the third class of moderators, judgmental task features. Indeed, the experimental procedures relevant to testing this third class of moderators open up interesting new challenges for the AIM to explore. For example, why is it that affect is more likely to be infused in facilitatory as opposed to inhibitory encoding processes?

Future research will need to paint a more comprehensive picture of the circumstances under which mood-congruency effects versus mood-incongruency effects versus no mood effects are obtained. Indeed, research must move more assertively into pursuing interactive effects of mood and self-cognitions. For example, how does mood affect the peripheral self-conceptions of persons with high self-esteem who complete an inhibitory encoding task?

Another yet untested moderator of mood congruency effects on the self is the individual difference variable of affect intensity (Larsen & Diener, 1987). An example is provided by the work of Haddock, Zanna, and Esses (1994). These researchers split their sample into participants who were high versus low in affect intensity. After mood induction, participants expressed their attitudes and stereotypic beliefs toward social groups.

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